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Clerk1 Suproma Court. U:a:i 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED 
SCIENCE, a Utah body 
politic and corporate, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
BEAR STEARNS & CO., 
a corporation, 
vs. 
Defendant-Third Party 
Plaintiff & Petitioner.: 
PHILLIP A. BULLEN, JAY R. 
BINGHAM, 0. C. HAMMOND, 
JAY DEE HARRIS, BEVERLY 
D. KUMPFER, SNELL OLSEN, 
REX G. PLOWMAN, W. B. ROBINS, 
ALVA C. SNOW, WILLIAM R. 
~---___..,,ooNK:Ci'.l A. tATii6fJ , j ufiN UOt;::, , 
THE INSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL 
OF UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED 
SCIENCE, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED 
SCIENCE, a Utah body 
politic and corporate, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
SUTRO & CO., INCORPORATED, 
vs. 
Defendant-Third Party 
Plaintiff & Petitioner, 
PHILLIP A. BULLEN, et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
WAIVER OF FILING RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT 
DONALD A. CATRON, AND ADOPTION 
BY REFERENCE, OF OTHER 
RESPONDENT BRIEFS FILED BY 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS 
IN LIEU THEREOF 
(C;nsolidated) 
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UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED 
SCIENCE, a Utah body 
politic and corporate, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
BOSWORTH, SULLIVAN AND 
COMPANY, 
vs. 
Defendant-Third party 
Plaintiff & Petitioner. 
PHILLIP A. BULLEN, et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED 
SCIENCE, a Utah body 
politic and corporate, 
Plaint-i ff ,,,.,;i 
MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER 
& SMITH, INC., a corporation, 
vs. 
Defendant-Third Party 
Plaintiff & Petitioner, 
PHILLIP A. BULLEN, et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED 
SCIENCE, a Utah body 
politic and corporate, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
HORNBLOWER & WEEKS-HEMPHILL, 
NOYES, INC., a corporation, 
vs. 
Defendant-Third Party 
Plaintiff & Petitioner, 
PHILLIP A. BULLEN, et al., 
Third Party Defendants 
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3 
Comes now DONALD A. CATRON, one of the Third-Party 
Defendants - Respondents, in the above entitled action, by and 
through his counsel of record, and respectfully waives the 
filing of a Respondent's Brief regarding the matter now on 
appeal in the above entitled Court, and in lieu thereof, adopts 
by reference the briefs filed by the other named Third-Party 
Defendants-Respondents in total, as though he had filed such 
a brief in his behalf. -~~ 
DATED this ~ 
SEN 
Attorney for Third Party Defendant 
Donald A. Catron 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
mailed, postage prepaid, this :...JI~ day of s mb ~ epte er, 1979, 
to the following: 
Robert s. Campbell, Jr. 
H. Wayne Wadsworth 
Michael F. Heyrend 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street, Twelfth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Certain Respondents 
Bullen, Bingham, Hammond, Harris 
Kumpfer, Olsen, Plowman, Robins, 
Snow, Stockdale, Tibbals, Taggart, 
Broadbent and Neuberger 
Daniel M. Allred 
Kathlene W. Lowe 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants and 
Defendant Third-Party Plaintiffs 
Bear Stearns & Co., Sutro & Co., 
I~corporated and Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 
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4 
Harold G. Christensen 
R. Brent Stephens 
Dee V. Benson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant and 
Defendant Third-Party Plaintiff 
Bosworth, Sullivan and Company 
David L. Wilkinson 
County Attorney's Office 
Room C-220 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Utah State University of 
Agriculture and Applied Science 
Lyle w. Hillyard 
HILLYARD LOW & ANDERSON 
175 East First North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
John W. Morrison 
David R. Melton 
r<noAM MAOOTCAl\T <. c11UTTOl.S. LTD. 
Attorneys for certain Responde~ts 
Bullen, Bingham, Hammond, Ha:ris, 
Kumpfer, Olsen, Plowman, Robins, 
Snow, Stockd.ale, Tibba Taggart, 
Broadbent and Neuber 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANSWERING BRIEF OF CERTAIN RESPONDENTS: BULLEN, BINGHAM, 
HAMMOND, HARRIS, KUMPFER, OLSEN, PLOWMAN, ROBINS, SNOW, 
STOCKDALE, TIBBALS, TAGGART, BROADBENT, AND NEUBERGER 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
(The Primary Actions) 
The above-entitled actions,consolidated for appeal, 
were commenced by Plaintiff-Respondent Utah State University 
(hereinafter "the University") to recover losses sustained by 
it in connection with its purchase and sale of securities 
between September, 1970 and March, 1973. The University 
seeks to recover those losses and related expenses from the 
Defendant-Appellant Stockbrokers (hereinafter "the Brokers") 
which executed the stock transactions during that period on 
1/ 
the University's behalf.- The University contends that it is 
entitled to recover those losses because the transactions were 
ultra vires. 
1/ The Brokers in the captioned actions are (1) Bear Stearns & Co., (2) Sutro & Co., (3) Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., and (4) Bosworth, Sullivan & Co. The appeals in 
all four actions have been consolidated with the appeals in a 
fifth action involving Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc. 
by order of this Court dated March 20, 1979. The first three 
Brokers have filed a joint brief referred to hereinafter as the 
"Bear Stearns brief". Bosworth, Sullivan & Co. has filed a 
separate brief referred to hereinafter as the "Bosworth brief". 
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(The Third Party Actions) 
The Brokers, in addition to their denial of liability 
to the University in the primary actions, filed third-party 
complaints. Those complaints were filed sometime aFter the 
University initiated the primary actions. Those third-party 
2/ 
complaints named, among others,-The Institutional Council as 
a State entity and also named individually the members of The 
3/ 
Institutional Council-together with the President of the 
University, the Vice President for Business Affairs and the 
4/ 
Secretary of The Institutional Council.-
This Brief is respectfully submitted on behalf of the 
individual Third-Party Defendants-Respondents Phillip A. Bullen, 
Jay R. Bingham, O. c. Hanunond, Jay Dee Harris, Beverly D. 
Kumpfer, Snell Olsen, Rex G. Plowman, W. B. Robins, Alva C. 
2/ Apart from the Respondents involved in these appeals, the 
Brokers' third-party complaints also asserted claims against 
the State, the Institutional Council, and two banks which had 
acted as transfer agents in the security transactions at 
issue. The Brokers' claims against the foregoing entities 
were dismissed by the trial court. The Brokers have apparently 
chosen not to appeal those rulings. 
ll Phillip A, Bullen, Jay R. Bingham, O, C. Hammond, Jay Dee 
Harris, Beverly D. Kumpfer, Snell Olsen, Rex G. Plowman, Iv. B. 
Robins, Alva C. Snow, lvilliam R. Stockdale, and Jane S. Tibbals 
were Institutional Council members during the period in questi0n. 
ii The University Administrators were Glenn L. Taggart (Presi-
dent), Dee A. Broadbent (Vice President for Business Affairs) 
and L. Mark Neuberger (Secretary to the University's Institutional 
Council). The third-party complaints also named Donald A. Catron, 
another administrator who actually ran the investment program 
on a day-to-day basis, as a defendant. Mr. Catron is separately 
represented. 
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Snow, William R. Stockdale, Jane S. Tibbals, Glenn L. Taggart, 
Dee A. Broadbent, and L. Mark Neuberger in response to the 
Brokers' opening briefs. 
DISPOSITION IN LOl'lER COURT 
Subsequent to the filing of the third-party complaints, 
these individual Respondents successfully moved the trial court 
to dismiss the third-party action. The trial court ruled that 
as a matter of law the third-party complaints did not state 
causes of action against these individual Respondents. The 
court entered its Order dismissing the third-party complaints 
against these individual Respondents on March 21, 1978 and 
certified its ruling as final for the purposes of appeal on 
January 3, 1979. 
The trial court also entered orders in the primary 
action between the University and the Brokers from which the 
Brokers are presently appealing and which are set out in the 
5/ 
Brokers' briefs.- Those issues do not directly relate to these 
individual Respondents and are, accordingly, not addressed as 
separate points within this brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL BY BROKERS 
The Brokers seek reversal of the trial court's 
dismissal of the Brokers' third-party complaints. 
~/ Bear Stearns brief, p. 1-2; Bosworth brief, p. 2. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Each of these individual Respondents either sat on the 
Institutional Council or maintained an administrative position 
with the University during the period of the investment program 
at issue. The Council and Administrators were charged with the 
responsibility of the general and overall administration of 
the University. The responsibilities of these individuals 
were as varied as the University itself, ranging from curricu-
lum and internal University affairs to the fiscal management 
of the University. These individuals, whether drawn from 
ranks of the community to serve the University or professional 
educators, were granted wide discretionary authority to manage 
a large university. 
The involvement of these Respondents in this case 
arises from the attempt of the Brokers to shift ultimate legal 
responsibility for the University's alleged ultra vires 
investment program onto the individuals who administered the 
University, The individuals were brought into the cases long 
after the cases were filed and these individuals were dismissed 
from the cases substantially before the trial court fixed 
liability to the Brokers. The position of these individuals 
with respect to the Statement of Facts is limited by the 
procedural posture and history of their entry into the case 
and the granting of their Motions to Dismiss. 
The Brokers have laid out an elaborate and lengthy 
Statement of Facts based on a record which either antedates 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the entry of these individual Respondents or postdates their 
dismissal from the actions. These individual Respondents 
need not quarrel with the Statements of Facts made by the 
6/ 
Brokers, save for·two notable exceptions,-because it is the 
factual allegations of the third-party complaints which are 
controlling on a motion to dismiss rather than the compre-
hensive texts in the Brokers' briefs. In that regard, four 
factual propositions emerge as the central predicates of the 
Brokers' claims against these individual Respondents: 
1. The Brokers alleged that these Respondents 
approved one or more resolutions which represented 
that the University had authority to purchase and 
sell securities. The resolutions designated 
Donald Catron as one of the individuals who was 
empowered to direct purchases and sales of 
securities on the University's behalf. The 
resolutions also provided that they would remain 
in effect until revoked in writing. 
2. The Brokers further alleged that these 
Respondents ratifiea Catron's actions by reviewing 
periodic reports prepared by Catron which described 
the transactions he had entered into on the 
University's behalf •• 
6/ In the Bear Stearns brief (p. 64) the Brokers incorrectly 
contend that the Court must also treat as true the following 
allegations: (1) that Respondents exceeded their statutory 
authority in authorizing or ratifying the securities trans-
actions in issue and (2) allegations that Respondents' actions 
gave rise to an express or implied agreement to indemnify the 
Brokers against liability arising out of the transactions in 
question. Those allegations, however, are conclusions of law 
which are not admitted for purposes of a motion to dismiss. 
E.g. Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974); Mirin 
v. Justices of the Nevada Supreme Court, 415 F.Supp. 1178, 1181 
(D.Nev. 1976) (construing identical federal rule). Even if true, 
however, those allegations would not be sufficient to state a 
cause of action against Respondents, for the reasons set forth 
in the following portion of this brief. 
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3. The Brokers further alleged that they relied 
upon the foregoing actions by these Respondents in 
executing the securities transactions in question on 
the University's behalf. 
4. Apart from the foregoing claims, three of 
the Brokers have also alleged that Catron's authority 
to purchase securities on behalf of the University 
was revoked on December 4, 1972, but that Respondents 
failed to so advise the Brokers until March, 1973. 
Solely for purposes of this appeal, the factual allega-
tions of the Brokers' third-party complaints will be treated as 
substantially true. Additionally, however, the pleadings of 
the Brokers and, indeed, the discovery conducted in the cases 
at large, are devoid of the allegation, suggestion or nuance 
that these Respondents acted in bad faith. Rather, the record 
is clear that these individual Respondents at all times acted 
in good faith with the best interests of the University in 
mind and acted pursuant to and within the duties and responsi-
bilities for the management of the University's fiscal affairs 
with which they were charged. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
BROKERS' THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINTS ON THE 
GROUNDS THAT THESE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS 
ARE ENTITLED TO OFFICIAL IMMUNITY 
As Public Officials, These 
Respondents Are Entitled To 
Immunity For Acts Performed 
In Good Faith And Within 
The Scope Of Their Duties 
Public officials, both in Utah and elsewhere, have long 
enjoyed a qualified immunity from suits growing out of the 
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performance of their duties. E.g. Board of Education of Nebo 
School District v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 280 P. 1069 (1929); 
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 575 (1959). Such immunity has been 
deemed necessary to insure that public officials are free to 
exercise their duties unencumbered by the fear of damage suits 
growing out of the performance of those duties suits which 
consume time and energy better devoted to public service and 
which deter competent individuals from assuming the responsi-
bilities of public office. Anderson v. Granite School District, 
17 Ut.2d 405, 413 P.2d 597 (1966); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 
334, 340-41 (10th Cir, 1973). 
To be sure, the scope of immunity to which particular 
officials are entitled varies depending upon the nature of the 
official's responsibilities. Barr v. Matteo, supra; Connell v. 
Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977). Public employees whose 
duties are purely ministerial need little protection. However, 
officials such as Respondents who are charged with a wide range 
of duties and responsibilities which require the exercise of 
judgment and discretion, must be and are accorded a relatively 
broad form of immunity. Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 343-44 
(10th Cir. 1973). 
This Court has, accordingly, recognized the need for 
such protection and has repeatedly extended immunity to 
officials charged with discretionary duties. Sheffield v. 
Turner, 21 Ut.2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968); Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 
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121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952). So long as such officials 
have acted in good faith and within the scope of the matters 
committed to their supervision or control they have been 
accorded immunity, Anderson v. Granite School District, supra, 
at Ut.2d 407, P.2d 599; Board of Education of Nebo School 
District v. Jeppson, supra; Prosser, The Law of Torts, Sec. 
132, pp. 988-991 (4th Ed. 1971); 4 McQuillen, Municipal Corpora-
tions, Sec. 12.208. As this Court has succinctly stated: 
••• it is the settled policy of the law 
that when a public official acts in good 
faith, believing what he does to be within 
the scope of his authority and in the line 
of his duty, he is not liable for damages 
even if he makes a mistake in the exercise 
of his judgment. Anderson, supra, at 
Ut.2d 407, P.2d 599. 
In these related actions, Respondents' immunity fully 
justified dismissal of the Brokers' third-party complaints. 
The Brokers' complaints sought to hold Respondents personally 
liable for actions which Respondents took in supervising the 
University's financial affairs. Yet those complaints utterly 
failed to allege facts sufficient to impose personal liability 
on Respondents. The Brokers could not and did not allege that 
Respondents had ever acted in bad faith. Nor could the Brokers 
allege that Respondents had acted outside the scope of their 
duties, for the responsibility of overseeing investment of 
the University's funds is one of the many duties imposed upon 
Respondents by statute. Utah Code Ann. Secs. 53-48-10(5); 
-8-
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... 
7/ 
53-48-20 (3) .-
In short, the Brokers' third-party complaints did not 
allege facts which would justify stripping Respondents of their 
immunity for actiGns which they took in a good faith effort to 
carry out their duties. Respondents respectfully submit, 
therefore, that the trial court properly dismissed the Brokers' 
third-party complaints. 
Respondents Are Entitled To Immunity 
Even If They Inadvertently Exceeded 
Their Authority, Because They Were 
Acting In Good Faith And Within The 
Scope Of Their Duties 
The Brokers concede that the courts of the State of 
Utah have recognized and applied the common law principles 
of governmental immunity. The Brokers have also implicitly 
conceded that the scope of that protection turns on the issue 
of whether the duties of the official are discretionary or 
ministerial. Indeed, the Brokers have all but ceded the 
proposition that these individual Respondents were charged 
with discretionary as opposed to ministerial duties. The 
Brokers urge only that the immunity is denied these Respondents 
7/ Utah Code Ann. Sec. 53-48-10 (5) (1970) provides, in 
relevant part, that each university may handle its own 
financial affairs under the general supervision of the Board 
of Higher Education, which has delegated such duties to the 
Institutional Council. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 53-48-20 (3) (1970) provides, in 
relevant part, that an institution may retain, accwnulate, 
invest, commit and expend funds received for research 
programs authorized by the Board, 
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because "they exceeded their authority" by authorizing 
8/ 
investments which were later determined to be ultra vires.-
The Brokers' apparent contention that public officials 
may be held personally liable whenever they exceed their 
authority seriously misconstrues the limits of the immunity 
doctrine. The flaw in the Brokers' argument is its failure 
to acknowledge that an official may unwittingly exceed his 
authority but at the same time his actions may be within the 
scope of his duties. Were the law as the Brokers would have 
it, the distinctions drawn by the courts between discretionary 
9/ 
and ministerial acts would be pyrrhic and meaningless.-
The scope of an official's immunity is dependent 
upon the nature of the officials responsibilities. Officials 
such as Respondents, whose duties require the exercise of 
judgment and discretion, enjoy a broader form of immunity 
than those officials and employees whose duties are ministerial 
8/ Bear Stearns brief, pp. 70-73; Bosworth brief, pp. 38-40. 
This Court determined that such transactions were ultra vires 
in 1975. First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah St~nIVersity, 
544 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah 1975). 
9/ Implicit in the Brokers' argument is the premise that any 
time an official exceeds his authority he acts outside the 
scope of his duties and thereby loses immunity. Under that 
premise, any wrongful act is outside the scope of the official's 
duties and thereby is an excess of authority. Were that the 
law, the doctrine of official immunity would be utterly meaning-
less because the commission of wrongful acts would presumably be 
outside the scope of an official's duties. 
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in nature. Connell v. Tooele City, surpa; Board of Education 
of Nebo School District v. Jeppson, supra; Smith v. Losee, 
supra; Prosser, The Law of Torts, Sec. 132, pp. 988-989 (4th 
Ed, 1971). Court9 do not permit officials who are charged 
with discretionary responsibilities to be held liable simply 
because they have inadvertently "exceeded their authority". 
Instead, as the Supreme Court long ago noted, "A distinction 
must be • , observed between excess of jurisdiction and the 
clear absence of all jurisdiction." Bradley v. Fisher, 80 
U.S. 335, 351-52 (1871); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 
(1896); C.J.S. "Officers" Sections 125-127, Only in the 
latter case -- i.e., when officials have acted totally outside 
the scope of the matters committed to their control and super-
vision may they be held personally liable. 
Thus, it is well established that officials cannot be 
held personally liable so long as they act in good faith and 
within the scope of the matters committed to their supervision, 
even though they may "exceed their authority" through an error 
in judgment. For instance, in Anderson v. Granite School 
District, supra, several landowners attempted to hold the 
individual members of a school board personally liable for 
official acts taken in connection with the acquisition of 
property for a new school, a matter within the scope of the 
board members' duties, Despite allegations in the landowners' 
complaint that the school board members had exceeded their 
authority, this Court upheld dismissal of that complaint. 
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Numerous decisions, both in Utah and elsewhere, reflect 
10/ 
the same principle.~A good example of the application of that 
principle to facts resembling those here is Lister v. Board of 
Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 72 Wis.2d 282, 240 
10/ ~, Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Ut.2d 314, 445 P.2d 367, 369 
(1968) (prison warden could not be held personally liable for 
negligent supervision so long as he was acting in good faith 
and within the scope of his duties); Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 
Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907, 909 (1952) (members of Road commission 
could not be held personally liable for damages arising "out of 
the faithful and honest performance of their duties"); Board of 
Education of Nebo School District v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 280 
P. 1065 (1920) (county treasurer could not be held liable for 
erroneous decision made in good faith); Smith v. Losee, 485 
F.2d 334 (10th Cir, 1973) (university officials in Utah charged 
with broad duties could not be held personally liable for 
official acts unless malice was shown); Standard Nut Margarine 
Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (Tax Commissioner 
could not be held personally liable for erroneous construction 
and application of statute, as it was a matter committed to his 
control and supervision); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 
(2d Cir. 1949) (nwhat is meant by saying that the officer must 
be acting within his power cannot be more than that the occasion 
must be such as would have justified the act, if he had been 
using his power for any of the purposes on whose account it was 
vested in him"); Cole v. Tuttle, 366 F.Supp. 1252, 1254 (N.D. 
Miss. 1973) (prison board officials could not be held individ-
ually liable for alleged negligence by Board in administering 
prison); Miller v. City and County of San Francisco, 187 Cal. 
App.2d 480, 483, 9 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1960) (city officials mis-
represented to plaintiff that city would take action which the 
officials had no power to authorize; held: no liability because 
officials were acting within scope of their employment); Martelli 
v. Pollack, 162 Cal.App.2d 655, 328 P.2d 795 (1958) (city officials 
could not be held personally liable for entering into ultra vires 
contract, even though "they may have labored under some-mIS-~~­
apprehension as to the scope of their powers"); Gildea v. 
Ellershaw, 363 Mass. 800, 298 N.E.2d 847 (1973) (city officials 
who followed erroneous procedure in removing city manager could 
not be held personally liable for errors in exercise of judgment 
and discretion); Wray v. McMahon, 183 Miss. 592, 182 So. 99, 100 
(1938) (city officials could not be held personally liable for 
negligence or error in appointing police officers); Lister v. 
Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 72 Wis.2d 
282, 240, N.W.2d 610, 621-22 (1976) (university officials could 
not be held personally liable for damages arising from their 
allegedly erroneous interpretation of statute and acts in excess 
of statutory authority). 
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N.W.2d 610 (1976). There, as here, the plaintiff sought to 
hold university officials personally liable, claiming that 
the officials had exceeded their statutory authority. In 
affirming dismissal of that complaint, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court stated: 
The general rule is that a public officer 
is not personally liable to one injured 
as a result of an act performed within 
the scope of his official authority and 
in the line of his official duty • . • 
* * * 
The complaint in this action contains 
allegations that [the defendant] mis-
construed or misapplied sec. 36.16, 
Stats., thereby exceeding his authority 
and power under that statute. It is 
clear that the protection afforded by 
the principle of civil immunity attaches 
only to the consequence of official conduct 
and does not extend to an officer's actions 
as a private citizen. However, for the 
purpose of imposing liability for damages, 
a distinction must be made between those 
acts which constitute a mistake of judgment 
within the officer's lawful authority and 
those which are completely outside that 
authority. [The defendant's] conduct in 
this case clearly falls within the former 
category and, therefore, within the scope 
of the immunity. [footnotes omitted] 240 
N.W.2d at 622. 
In the cases presently before the Court, the Brokers 
sought to hold Respondents personally liable for discretionary 
acts which were performed in good faith and were within the 
scope of the matters committed to Respondents' supervision 
-13-
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11/ 
and control.~As noted above, Respondents are responsible under 
the statutes of this State for overseeing the University's 
financial affairs. Utah Code Ann., (1970) Secs. 53-48-10(5); 
53-48-20(3). The· acts for which the Brokers seek to hold 
Respondents liable fall squarely within the scope of the fore-
going duties; as such, Respondents are entitled to immunity. 
The cases cited in the Brokers' briefs do not compel 
the contrary. The primary case upon which the Brokers rely 
simply illustrates that the immunity -enjoyed by public employees 
who are performing purely ministerial duties is narrower than 
that for public officials who are performing discretionary 
duties. Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah 1977). 
11/ There is no question that Respondents were performing 
discretionary acts when they authorized or ratified the 
investment of University funds. At the prompting of the 
Governor and State Auditor, Respondents determined that idle 
University funds could be best employed by investing them. 
Such a decision undoubtedly required the exercise of judgment 
on the part of these Respondents. See Connell v, Tooele City, 
572 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1977); Board of Education of Nebo 
School District v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 280 P. 1065, 1069 
(1929); Lister v, Board of Regents of Univ. Wis. System, 72 
Wis.2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610, 621-22 (1976). 
The Brokers have suggested that the failure to notify 
them of the alleged revocation of Catron's authority in 
December, 1972 involved a ministerial act; however, as one 
of the Brokers has explicitly noted, there was considerable 
confusion about Catron's instructions after December, 1972 
(Bosworth brief, p. 8). In deciding whether notice to the 
Brokers was necessary, Respondents were obviously called upon 
to exercise their judgment. See cases cited above. 
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12/ 
The other cases cited by the Brokers are equally inapposite.~ 
So long as the officials are pursuing their duties in 
good faith, they are entitled to immunity. Clearly the scope 
of the duties of these individual Respondents is the management 
of the University's funds. While the investments may have been 
ultra vires the management of those funds nonetheless was within 
the scope of their duties. It is that distinction that the 
Brokers fail to see. 
In summary, the Brokers' thi~d-party complaints could 
not and did not allege as a matter of law that Respondents had 
acted in bad faith or totally beyond the scope of their duties. 
In the absence of such allegations, there is no basis for 
stripping the individual Respondents of their immunity, as the 
trial court properly recognized. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
THE BROKERS' THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINTS 
DID NOT STATE CAUSES OF ACTION 
FOR INDEMNITY OR CONTRIBUTION 
While the Brokers have characterized and placed different 
labels on their theories of recovery, in fact they seek indemnity 
12/ In only two of the other decisions cited by the Brokers 
were public officials actually held liable. The first of those 
decisions, Blonquist v. Summit County, 25 Ut.2d 387, 483 P.2d 
430 (1971), is inapplicable because like the Cornwall case, it 
" ... involved a ministerial function only", 25 Ut.2d at 390, 
483 P.2d at 432. The other decision simply held that officials 
could be held liable if they acted", .• entirely outside the 
scope of their official duties" (Emphasis added). Roe v. 
Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 527, 57 P.2d 1128, 1131 (1936). Neither 
decision warrants holding Respondents liable in this case. 
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from these Respondents or partial contribution and no other 
remedy. The Brokers' claims, regardless of the characteriza-
tion, are insufficient to state a cause of action against 
these Respondents.even if they were not public officials 
for the reasons set out below. 
The Brokers Are Barred From 
Seeking Indemnity Because They 
Actively Participated In The 
Events Giving Rise To Liability 
Even if Respondents were not public officials entitled 
to the benefit of official immunity, the Brokers' third-party 
complaints would not be sufficient to state a cause of action 
for indemnity. The Brokers would be barred from seeking 
indemnity, because they played an active and essential role 
in the transactions giving rise to liability -- buying and 
selling securities, extending credit, and receiving commissions. 
In light of their active participation, the Brokers could not 
and cannot shift all liability in connection with those trans-
actions to Respondents. 
It is well established that no right to indemnity 
exists where a person has actively participated in the events 
giving rise to liability. Bettilyon Construction Co. v. 
State Road Commission, 20 Ut,2d 319, 437 P.2d 449, 450 (1968); 
Schneider v, Suhrmann, 8 Ut.2d 35, 327 P.2d 822, 826 (1958); 
Pinal County v. Adams, 13 Ariz. App. 571, 479 P.2d 718 (1971); 
William F. Larrick v. Burt Chevrolet, Inc., 147 Colo. 133, 
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362 P.2d 1030 (1961); Bush Terminal Bldgs. v. Luckenbach S.S. 
Co., 9 N.Y.2d 426, 174 N.E.2d 516, 214 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1961). 
A right to indemnity will be granted only where an individual 
is held vicariousiy liable for the wrongful acts of another 
or where there is so great a difference between the culpability 
of two tortfeasors that one of them should be forced to bear 
the entire loss. Cahill Brothers, Inc. v, Clementina Co., 
208 Cal.App.2d 367, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1962); Rio Grande Gas 
Co. v. Strahmann Farms, Inc., 80 N.M. 432, 457 P.2d 364 (1969). 
See also Chamberlain v. McCleary, 217 F.Supp. 591, 597 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1963). 
Here the facts do not justify shifting the Brokers' 
liability to these Respondents. If the Brokers are held 
liable to the University, it will presumably be because they 
had a duty to determine for themselves whether the University 
13/ 
had authority to enter into the transactions in question.~ 
Yet, if Brokers have failed to fulfill that duty, they may not 
seek indemnity from these Respondents. Even if these Respon-
dents were charged with a similar duty, as the Brokers have 
13/ See First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State University, 
544 P.2d at 892. 
See further Rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange 
imposing a similar duty upon the Brokers. 2 CCH New York 
State Exchange Guide, Paras. 2405, 2405.10. 
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vigorously contended, the Brokers and Respondents would be no 
more than joint tortfeasors. Under those circumstances, no 
action for indemnity would lie, even under the cases cited by 
14/ 
the Brokers.-
A finding that the Brokers have stated a cause of 
action against these individuals for indemnity, contribution 
or warranty together with the holding that the Brokers are 
liable to the University would indeed be anomalous. To so 
hold would be to find that the Brokers were essentially free 
from fault. If the Brokers are free from fault the implication 
must bode ill for the University's primary claim against the 
Brokers. 
There is simply no great difference in the culpability 
(or lack of culpability) of the Brokers and Respondents such 
as is necessary to justify an indemnity action. The fact that 
the Brokers' knowledge of the limits of the University's powers 
is merely constructive knowledge does not justify shifting 
14/ For example, in Hoggan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 P. 512, 
514 (1903), the Court noted" ••• 'It is only where a person 
knows or must be presumed to know that his act was unlawful, 
that the law will refuse to aid him in seeking an indemnity 
or contribution ... '. We admit the rule that the law will 
not endorse contribution nor indemnity between wrongdoers. 
But that rule does not apply to any case where the act of the 
agent was not manifestly illegal in itself and was done bona 
fide in the execution of his agency and without knowledge 
(either actual or im lied b law) that it was ille al. . . ". 
[Citations omitted~ Emphasis added . 
In these cases the Brokers' constructive knowledge would bar an 
action for indemnity. See further Trimble v. Exchange Bank of 
Kentucky, 23 Ky. L. Rep, 367, 62 S.W. 1027 (1901). 
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liability for those transactions to Respondents -- for 
Respondents' "knowledge" would also be constructive. Nor 
does the fact that Respondents passed resolutions authorizing 
the opening of accounts with the Brokers justify holding the 
Respondents personally liable. The Brokers are sophisticated 
investment houses. They had access to the statutes of this 
State and to attorneys who could interpret those statutes for 
them. 
In short, the Brokers played an active and essential 
role in the transactions giving rise to liability. As such, 
they are barred from shifting all responsibility for these 
transactions to Respondents. 
The Trial Court Properly Found 
That Respondents Cannot Be Held 
Individually Liable For Warranties 
Or Representations Made By The 
Institutional Council As A Whole 
In their briefs, the Brokers argue that their third-
party complaints state a cause of action for misrepresentation 
or breach of warranty. They contend that resolutions passed 
by the Institutional Council, authorizing the opening of 
accounts with the Brokers, incorrectly represented that the 
15/ 
University had authority to invest in common stocks.~ 
It matters not whether the Brokers' characterization 
of the council's resolutions is correct. Even if the resolu-
tions constituted representations or warranties, they were 
~/ Bear Stearns brief, pp. 66-68; Bosworth brief, pp. 36-37. 
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representations or warranties made by the Institutional Council 
as a whole and not by the individual members of the Council. 
If the Brokers have a cause of action for misrepresentation or 
breach of warranty, it is a claim against the Institutional 
16/ 
Council, not against these individual Respondents.~ 
The foregoing principle has been recognized in similar 
cases where attempts have been made to hold public officials 
personally liable on ultra vires contracts which they had 
entered into on behalf of public entities. In a majority of 
jurisdictions which have considered the issue, it is held that 
a public official can not be held personally liable on such a 
contract. Those decisions have been summarized by a noted 
commentator as follows: 
Ordinarily when an officer or public agent 
contracts in good faith with parties having 
knowledge of the extent of his authority or 
who have equal means of knowledge, espe-
cially where the authority of the officer 
is prescribed by law, he will not become 
individually responsible unless the intent 
to incur liability is clearly expressed, 
although it should be found that, through 
ignorance of the law, he may have exceeded 
his authority. 
17/ 
4 McQuillen, Municipal Corporations, Section 12.214.~ 
16/ It should be noted that the Brokers asserted such a claim 
against the Institutional Council in the lower court. The 
trial court dismissed that claim and the Brokers have apparently 
chosen not to appeal from that ruling. 
17/ In addition to the decisions cited by McQuillen see 
Taranto v. McBride, 29 U.C.Q.B. 13 (1869). 
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Here, any warranty or representation was made by the 
Council as a whole, not by the individual Respondents. If the 
Brokers have a claim for misrepresentation or breach of warranty, 
it is a claim against the Council. It cannot reasonably be 
contended that Respondents made any representations or warranties 
in their individual capacities for which they could be held 
personally liable, 
The Brokers' Third-Party 
Complaints Did Not State A Cause 
Of Action For Contribution 
In the alternative to their claims for indemnity, the 
Brokers' third-party complaints attempted to state a cause of 
action for contribution, on the theory that the Brokers and 
Respondents were joint tortfeasors. However, the Brokers failed 
to recognize that there is no right to contribution between joint 
tortfeasors in Utah for acts committed prior to May 8, 1973, 
18/ 
the effective date of the Utah Contribution Statute.~Brunyer 
v. Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d 521 (1976). 
In Brunyer, this Court held that the Utah statute 
governing contribution between joint tortfeasors has no 
retroactive effect. Affirming the dismissal of a third-party 
complaint, the Court stated: 
The contribution statute established a 
primary right and duty which was not in 
18/ Utah Code Ann., (1970) Sec. 78-27-39. 
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existence at the time the injuries in 
this case arose, and the statute not 
being retroactive by its terms did not 
create a right on behalf of the third-
party plaintiffs. 551 P.2d at 522. 
In the cases now before the Court, all the acts on 
which the Brokers base their claim for contribution occurred 
between September, 1970 and March 20, 1973. As such, the 
Brokers' claims for contribution failed to state a cause of 
action and were properly dismissed. 
In their briefs, the Brokers nave contended that under 
Utah common law they were entitled to maintain a cause of 
19/ 
action for contribution.~In support of that contention the 
Brokers rely upon dicta in several cases which actually dealt 
20/ 
with principles of indemnity.~However, in cases where this 
Court has actually dealt with the right to contribution it 
has expressly held that no right to contribution existed among 
joint tortfeasors under the common law of this State. For 
instance, in Hardman v. Matthews, 1 Ut.2d 110, 262 P.2d 748 
(Utah 1953), this Court upheld the dismissal of a third-party 
complaint seeking contribution, stating: 
contribution cannot be had between 
joint or concurring tort-feasors in a 
case like this, unless sanctioned by 
statute, there being none such in Utah. 
262 P.2d at 749. 
19/ Bear Stearns brief, p, 68. 
20/ Bear Stearns brief, p. 69; Bosworth brief pp. 36-37. 
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In Brunyerv. Salt Lake County, supra, this Court again observed, 
in dismissing a claim for contribution, that: 
The contribution statute established a 
primary right and duty which was not 
in existence at the time the injuries 
in this case arose. 551 P.2d at 522. 
Accordingly, Respondents respectfully submit that the 
trial court did not err in dismissing the Brokers' claims for 
contribution. 
III 
IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE 
UNIVERSITY IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
FROM THE BROKERS IT SHOULD SUMMARILY 
AFFIRM DISMISSAL OF THE BROKERS' 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINTS 
These Respondents respectfully submit that the Brokers' 
third-party complaints failed to state a cause of action and 
were properly dismissed for.the reasons set forth above; 
however, it should also be noted that there are other issues 
presently pending before this court, the resolution of which 
could make a decision on the sufficiency of the Brokers' 
third-party complaints unnecessary, 
In their briefs, the Brokers have argued, among other 
things, that the University's complaint in the primary action 
21/ 
failed to state a cause of action.~The Brokers contend that 
(a) the securities transactions in question were not ultra 
21/ Bear Stearns brief, pp. 31-61; Bosworth brief, pp. 9-34. 
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vires and (b) that the University should not be permitted to 
maintain these actions even if the transactions were ultra 
vires, The Brokers have advanced substantial arguments in 
support of both positions, If this Court agrees that the 
University's complaint in the primary action failed to state 
a cause of action, then Respondents submit that this Court 
may summarily affirm dismissal of the Brokers' third-party 
complaints without reaching the issues discussed in the fore-
going sections of this brief, 
The Brokers cannot maintain an action over if they 
are not held liable in the first instance. Under Rule 14 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant--third-party 
plaintiff may only maintain a claim against a party " ... who 
is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's 
claim against him," If the Brokers are not liable to the 
University, i.e., the plaintiff, they have no basis for 
maintaining a third-party claim against these Respondents 
under Rule 14. E.g. Southern Milling Co. v. U.S., 270 F.2d 
80, 84 (5th Cir, 1959) (construing identical provision of 
federal Rule 14). ("If there had been no recovery against 
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the appellant-defendant there could have been no liability on 
22/ 
the third-party claim.") -
Respondents respectfully submit, therefore, that if 
the University's complaints against the Brokers fall, the 
Brokers third-party complaints against Respondents must also 
fall. 
CONCLUSION 
The Brokers have strenuously argued in the trial court 
and argue now that it is unfair to permit the University to 
hold them liable in the primary action. Indeed, it can be 
said that the result is harsh and unjust. That harshness 
will not be lessened by shifting liability from the Brokers 
to these individual Third-Party Defendants who were striving 
to carry out their official duties in good faith nor does the 
harshness alter the fact that the Brokers' third-party 
22/ It has been suggested in one of the Brokers' briefs that 
this court must rule on the sufficiency of the third-party 
complaints even if the Court concludes that the University's 
complaint failed to state a cause of action, because the 
Brokers have included their attorneys fees among the sums for 
which they claim indemnity {Bear Stearns brief, p. 62). That 
contention is erroneous. The Brokers' attorneys fees do not 
constitute a portion of the plaintiffs' claims for which 
indemnity could properly be sought under Rule 14. Nor have 
the Brokers alleged any facts which even suggest that 
Respondents agreed to indemnify them against liability arising 
in connection with these transactions. 
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complaints fail to state a cause of action against these 
individuals running headlong into their official immunity and 
the fault of the Brokers themselves. 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Respon-
dents submit that the trial court did not err in dismissing 
the Brokers' third-party complaints against these individuals 
and that this Court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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